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Abstract
The popularity of the PDF format and the rich JavaScript environment
that PDF viewers offer make PDF documents an attractive attack vector
for malware developers. PDF documents present a serious threat to the
security of organizations because most users are unsuspecting of them and
thus likely to open documents from untrusted sources.
We propose to identify malicious PDFs by using conservative abstract
interpretation to statically reason about the behavior of the embedded
JavaScript code. Currently, state-of-the-art tools either: (1) statically
identify PDF malware based on structural similarity to known malicious
samples; or (2) dynamically execute the code to detect malicious behavior.
These two approaches are subject to evasion attacks that mimic the struc-
ture of benign documents or do not exhibit their malicious behavior when
being analyzed dynamically. In contrast, abstract interpretation is obliv-
ious to both types of evasions. A comparison with two state-of-the-art
PDF malware detection tools shows that our conservative abstract inter-
pretation approach achieves similar accuracy, while being more resilient
to evasion attacks.
1 Introduction
The Portable Document Format (PDF) allows for the embedding of interactive
elements written in JavaScript1. JavaScript in PDFs allows document creators
1While the major parts of the PDF format are standardized as ISO 32000-1 [15], the
specification of some advanced features supported by Adobe’s PDF software remains propri-
etary technology, and is referenced only by the ISO standard. The proprietary parts include
JavaScript support and APIs available in Adobe’s PDF software. Adobe provides an informal
specification for this JavaScript part in their public documentation [3, 4].
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Figure 1: Number of CVEs containing “Adobe Reader” in their description.
to support input validation in forms and to offer convenient shortcuts for com-
mon actions such as printing. More elaborate use cases of PDF JavaScript
include controlling embedded multimedia objects and interacting with the file
system or network. However, this rich and complex PDF JavaScript environ-
ment can also be used for illegitimate purposes. Indeed, previous work has
shown that JavaScript is the vector of choice for PDF malware because: (1)
implementation bugs in the PDF JavaScript extensions can be exploited to de-
liver and execute malicious payloads; (2) bugs in the JavaScript runtime and/or
sandbox can be triggered with JavaScript code; and (3) JavaScript can be used
as a facilitator to exploit vulnerabilities outside the JavaScript environment
through techniques like heap spraying [28, 16].
In 2008, the number of PDF-based attacks increased sharply. Then, in
2009, the number of Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) reported
against the Adobe Reader rose alarmingly. Previous work showed how the vast
majority of PDF malware uses JavaScript in one way or another [11, 28, 16].
The histogram in Figure 1 shows how the number of CVEs reported against
Adobe Reader is still at all time highs, with 39 CVEs already reported at the
time of writing (May 2018), despite the introduction of sandboxing for increased
safety in Adobe Reader X.
To lower the risk to users posed by PDF malware, several well-known tech-
niques are available. These techniques are either employed in the PDF viewer
software or implemented as (part of) stand-alone software products, such as
anti-virus or anti-malware scanning tools.
We found, however, that existing tools to detect PDF malware (both in in-
dustry and research), are vulnerable to various kinds of evasion attacks. Indeed,
simple static malware detectors (e.g. anti-virus tools) that rely on a signature
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database that contains known patterns of exploit code are subject to code obfus-
cation attacks. More recent and advanced approaches that use machine learn-
ing to automatically capture structural patterns of malware are vulnerable to
mimicry attacks where the malware emulates the structure of benign documents
to avoid detection. Finally, approaches that attempt to statically isolate and
analyze PDF JavaScript code are typically vulnerable to parser confusion at-
tacks, where the malware is embedded in non-standard, or poorly documented
PDF constructs that are meant to trip up code extractors.
Dynamic (runtime) malware detection tools, on the other hand, rely on
executing code under analysis in a special environment (a sandbox ) to detect
suspicious behaviors (e.g., network traffic, execution of known exploit code).
However, dynamic approaches are susceptible to sandbox evasion attacks where
the malicious code avoids detection by probing its environment to detect if it
is running in a sandbox environment [17]. Dynamic approaches also typically
load suspicious PDFs in a limited number of viewer applications, which makes
them fail to identify malware that checks the version of the viewer before picking
a vulnerability to exploit. More importantly, dynamic approaches are under-
approximative by nature, e.g., they may miss any malicious behavior that does
not manifest itself by loading the document only, but is rather triggered by user
interaction.
To address the limitations of signature-based, machine learning, and dy-
namic tools, we introduce SAFE-PDF , an abstract interpretation-based JavaScript
malware detector for PDF documents. Abstract interpretation is a powerful
framework for static program analysis that computes a sound over-approximation
of all possible program behaviors. In other words, abstract interpretation allows
us to check if a JavaScript program can ever exhibit malicious behavior under
any possible execution and viewer version. Furthermore, we address the main
limitation of existing static analysis approaches by developing one of the most
robust PDF JavaScript code extractors to date and validating it against 2952
documents that are known to cause issues in existing code extractors [16]. We
also complement abstract interpretation with a model of the JavaScript environ-
ment available to programs embedded in a PDF document, and a whitelist pol-
icy that does not allow malicious behavior (e.g., calls to vulnerable APIs, heap
spraying) to go undetected. The model and whitelist are easy to understand
and maintain, especially when compared to opaque machine learning classifiers.
Used together with our analysis in a conservative manner, obfuscation, mimicry,
and sandbox evasion attacks are no longer effective.
This prompted us to design the SAFE-PDF tool for high recall2. and ro-
bustness to evasion attacks. At the same time, SAFE-PDF (due to its straight-
forward model and whitelist) is flexible enough to be quickly adapted to changes
in the threat landscape, because it does not require training or tuning of param-
eters. In this paper, we show how SAFE-PDF achieves comparable precision3
and recall to state-of-the-art tools, while being oblivious to evasion strategies
2ratio of true positives to total number of malware in a given set of documents
3ratio of true positives to total number of reports
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that affect existing approaches. To summarize, we make the following contribu-
tions:
• We present a practical conservative abstract interpretation approach that
efficiently detects PDF malware by statically analyzing all possible behav-
ior of its embedded JavaScript code in less than 4 seconds on average.
• We develop one of the most robust PDF JavaScript code extractors to date,
by addressing all known limitations of existing extractors and testing our
tool on PDF documents with hard-to-extract JavaScript code [16].
• We compare SAFE-PDF against two state-of-the-art PDF malware de-
tection tools: PDF Malware Slayer [34], and Hidost [46], and show how
SAFE-PDF achieves comparable precision and recall while capturing mal-
ware that evade other tools.
2 Overview
2.1 Motivation
PDF malware frequently depends on embedded JavaScript code. While dis-
abling JavaScript in the PDF viewer and removing it from documents is the
most obvious and effective defense against JavaScript PDF malware, we think
that such measures impose an unnecessary loss of functionality on users. In-
deed, blind removal of JavaScript code breaks several harmless PDF documents
and prevents users from using very common and useful features such as form
input validation. SAFE-PDF thus aims at enabling JavaScript use in benign
documents while conservatively and robustly filtering out malicious documents.
JavaScript malware in PDF documents seeks to exploit bugs in PDF viewer
applications. As a result, an attacker is able to disrupt operation or gain control
of the targeted host system. The most frequently exploited vulnerabilities in
PDF viewer applications have shown to be: (1) lack of user input validation
and the allowing of arbitrary and unsafe operations outside the scope of the
document; (2) unintended side effects of otherwise legitimate operations (e.g. file
creation, or network access); and (3) memory corruption bugs in PDF JavaScript
extensions or in the runtime itself.
2.2 Existing approaches to PDF malware detection
The most common way for anti-virus software to identify PDF malware is
to search files for signatures or patterns of known malware. While cheap and
fast, signature-based methods are easily evaded through simple obfuscations.
Indeed, all examples of PDF malware we examined obfuscate their JavaScript
code to avoid detection by matching the code’s textual representation against a
signature (or pattern). While the vulnerable APIs that malware seeks to exploit
might be well known, detecting them syntactically can ultimately be prevented
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try {
eval("thi" + "s.f" + "ea" + "tu" + "re" +"A.n" + "ew" + "Ob" + "je" +
"ct" + "(n" + "ull)");↪→
}
Listing 1: Artificial malware example: evaluating string with simple obfuscation
of call to featureA.newObject(size)
function start(foo, bar) {
// bar = reference to featureB object
// encoded property = "sendMessage"
bar["\x73\x65" + "\x6e" + "\x64\x4d" + "\x65\x73" + "\x73\x61" +
"\x67\x65"]({↪→
data: /* ... */
});
}
Listing 2: Artificial malware example: obfuscated call to exploitable function
featureB.sendMessage()
through obfuscation. Code obfuscation in JavaScript can be achieved easily us-
ing the language’s built-in support for string manipulation, reflection, and dif-
ferent character-encoding. Listings 1 to 3 give examples of PDF malware using
different methods of obfuscation. The first two examples use string concate-
nation and string encoding to cloak the code they would execute and property
name they seek to access. Both of these obfuscations are simple enough to undo.
The example in Listing 3 is more complicated. It aliases and composes function
objects, uses string replacement, and the built-in unescape function to decode
its malicious payload. Through these powerful means of obfuscation, exploit
code can be rewritten (manually or automatically) in countless ways, and its
detection requires the signature database of anti-virus software to be updated
continuously and promptly. However, to reason about such complex code, more
advanced techniques are needed.
To overcome the limitations of signature-based techniques, metadata [43]
and structure-based [34, 46] learning approaches have been proposed. Both
types of approaches mainly differ in feature extraction. While metadata-based
approaches distinguish between benign and malicious documents based on fea-
tures such as file size, number of JavaScript components, or number of embedded
fonts, structure-based approaches classify documents based on paths in the PDF
document tree. Because simple obfuscation techniques do not alter the metadata
or structure of PDF documents, such approaches proved to be very efficient at
detecting PDF malware. However, because metadata and structural features do
not cause malicious behavior, metadata and structure-based approaches learn
only what features are correlated to malicious behavior. For this reason, they
can be easily evaded through mimicry [45] and reverse mimicry attacks [33] that
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function urpl(sc) {
var keyu = "%u";
var re = /XY/g;
sc = sc.replace(re, keyu);
return sc;
}
var unes = unescape
var pGvRIJZpqdN
for (i = 0; i < 18000; i++)
pGvRIJZpqdN = pGvRIJZpqdN + 0x77;
var s = "XY104CXY106FXY1072XY1065XY106DXY1020XY" +
"1069XY1070XY1073\x75XY106DXY1020XY1064" +
"XY106FXY106CXY106FXY1072XY1020XY1073XY" +
"1069XY1074XY1020XY1061XY106DXY1065XY10" +
"74\x25XY1020XY1063XY106FXY106EXY1073XY" +
"1065XY1063XY1074XY1065XY1074\x75XY1072" +
"XY1020XY1061XY1064XY1069XY10...";
↪→
↪→
↪→
↪→
↪→
↪→
pGvRIJZpqdN = unes(urpl(s));
Listing 3: Artificial malware example: obfuscated binary payload
hide malicious payloads in files exhibiting metadata and structural properties
of benign files.
var curDate = new Date();
var day = util.printd("ddd dd", curDate);
if (app.viewerVersion < 8.0) {
/* trigger exploit */
}
Listing 4: Artificial malware example: exploit code active only on PDF viewers
with a version less than 8.0
JavaScript-based detection approaches search for signs of malware closer to
the source of the problem, by targeting the JavaScript code embedded in PDF
documents. JavaScript-based detection approaches vary from fully static ma-
chine learning approaches [28, 49] to hybrid static and dynamic techniques [31,
48, 32]. On the one hand, all the JavaScript-based machine learning approaches
we are aware of perform lexical analysis of the JavaScript code and thus capture
only lexical features of malicious PDFs, making them susceptible to mimicry
attacks. Dynamic approaches (including the dynamic component of a hybrid
approach), on the other hand, partly rely on either an instrumented PDF viewer
or a special JavaScript runtime environment to dynamically detect malicious be-
havior. Any dynamic approach, however, is inherently limited by the fact that
they target a specific runtime environment only. They may miss malicious be-
havior due to simple checks that probe the environment, such as the one shown
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in Listing 4. As PDF viewers evolve and as vulnerabilities get fixed, dynamic
(and hybrid) approaches quickly become outdated unless significant effort is
invested in maintaining the analysis runtime environment.
2.3 Our approach: SAFE-PDF
We propose the use of conservative abstract interpretation of JavaScript as a
static analysis to detect malware in PDF documents. By means of abstract
interpretation, SAFE-PDF hits a sweet spot in the analysis landscape where
it can statically consider all possible executions of the JavaScript code, and
detect malicious behavior without relying on a special runtime environment or
requiring any user interaction. For example, during abstract interpretation,
all event listeners (e.g., Keystroke, Mouse Down, Mouse Enter) are automatically
triggered and analyzed. Because it reasons about the runtime behavior of the
JavaScript code instead of its structure or syntax, abstract interpretation is
oblivious to mimicry attacks. On the other hand, because it is not tied to a
specific runtime environment, SAFE-PDF requires less maintenance than its
dynamic analysis counterparts, and is not subject to sandbox evasion attacks.
By conservative, we mean that when in doubt, our analysis will err on the
safe side. In other words, we are willing to accept that our analysis may regard
a harmless PDF as malicious (i.e., a false positive), but we do not accept the
opposite (i.e., a false negative). Abstract interpretation considers all possible
behavior of the code under analysis without directly executing it. Based on its
result, we use a whitelisting mechanism to allow only safe behavior (e.g., restrict-
ing the use of JavaScript APIs to a known safe subset) and reject everything
else as malware.
The flowchart in Figure 2 highlights the main steps of SAFE-PDF , our PDF
malware detection tool. SAFE-PDF starts by extracting the JavaScript code
from the input document. Then, it complements the extracted code with a
model of the JavaScript runtime environment inside a PDF viewer following
Adobe’s specification, hereafter called the PDF-JS model, and performs ab-
stract interpretation. If abstract interpretation does not complete (i.e., it cannot
reach a fixpoint) within a certain time, the document is immediately reported
as malicious. If abstract interpretation terminates, SAFE-PDF then checks if
the document exhibits potentially malicious behavior. If so, the document is
reported as malicious. Otherwise, it is reported as benign.
2.4 Background: Abstract Interpretation
Abstract interpretation is a mathematically well-founded framework for static
analysis introduced by Cousot and Cousot in [19]. It addresses the challenge
of computing non-trivial properties of a program, which is known to be unde-
cidable when the concrete language semantics is used (c.f., Rice’s theorem [23,
chapter 9]). When concrete values and operations are approximated with ab-
stract values and abstract operations, however, such an abstract interpretation
of a program becomes computable. This comes at the cost of losing precision
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Figure 2: Overview of our malware detection analysis
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>String
Number NotNumber
{"42","NaN"} ... {"foo","bar"}
{"42"} ... {"NaN"} {"foo"} ... {"bar"}
⊥String
Figure 3: SAFE’s string abstract domain. It keeps track of sets of at most k dif-
ferent (number-) strings before approximating them as Number or NotNumber.
(k = 2 in this figure.)
for some properties of a program due to the abstraction (approximation) that
is applied. In the context of static analysis, such a (partially) imprecise result
means that some of our questions about a program (e.g., “is it malicious?”)
have to be answered with “We don’t know” for the analysis to be sound. In the
following paragraphs we explain some of the concepts behind abstract interpre-
tation that are required later on, and we give a step-by-step example. A formal
introduction to abstract interpretation can be found in [35, chapter 4].
From a program analysis point of view, abstract interpretation gives us the
ability to statically (i.e., without running the program) build an abstract state
for every point in the program. These states capture information about pos-
sible concrete executions and we can use them to validate assertions or find
problems in the programs we want to analyze. It is up to us, as the designer of
the abstract interpretation analysis, to choose an appropriate abstraction. An
abstraction consists of (1) abstract domains and (2) abstract semantics. The
abstract domains capture the program states in our analysis as abstract values.
It is important to note that an abstract value must be able to represent more
than one concrete value at a time. A domain maintains information in the form
of a lattice, which may have up to infinite elements and infinite height. (See
Figure 3 for an example of the abstract domain for string values used by SAFE-
PDF ; this is a simple powerset lattice ordered by set inclusion.) Depending
on the abstraction function, a domain can capture information about possible
concrete values using wide approximations. For example, if we were interested
only to find out whether a numeric value can be negative, we could abstract an
integer value as its sign; or we abstract it as a set or a range of concrete integer
values. We also need to encode the semantics of abstract operations, which
approximates concrete operations on abstract values. Given an abstraction, we
compute a fixpoint for a program in the abstraction. Note that in practice,
analysis might not reach a fixpoint for all programs within feasible time and
memory bounds.
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1 var msg = "hello world";
2 // local: msg := "hello world"
3 var arr = [
4 function(s) { console.println(s); },
5 function(s) { doc.getField("msgField").value = s; }
6 ];
7 // heap: #1 := Func
8 // #2 := Func
9 // #3 := Obj { "0" := #1, "1" := #2, length := 2 }
10 // local: arr := #3, msg
11 var i = doc.getField("inputField");
12 // local: arr, i := >String, msg
13 var n = Number.parseInt(i);
14 // local: arr, i, msg, n := >Number
15 var fn = arr[n];
16 // local: fn := {#1, #2, undefined}
17 if (fn === undefined)
18 // local: fn := {undefined}
19 app.alert("Unexpected input: " + i);
20 // calls app.alert()
21 else
22 // local: fn := {#1, #2}
23 fn(msg);
24 // calls either #1 or #2
Listing 5: PDF JavaScript snippet with abstract interpretation state in com-
ments
Abstract interpretation example We present a simple JavaScript code
snippet in Listing 5. Lines that start with // show updates to the abstract
state after every instruction. The var keyword at line 1 creates a local vari-
able, which our abstract state stores directly, together with the right-hand side
string-value, in the current local scope. The array arr (created at line 3) con-
tains two function objects, which are stored in the abstract heap at address #1
and #2 respectively. The abstract array object itself is stored at address #3
and referenced by a new variable in local. The arr object contains three prop-
erties: “0” and “1” point to the function objects at their respective addresses;
the internal length property approximates the number of items contained in
an array (or any JavaScript object). The next two instructions (lines 11 and
13) call a PDF API and JavaScript built-in function respectively. The call to
getField returns a user input that cannot be known statically. But based on the
specification of getField, our abstract interpretation can approximate the re-
turned value with the abstract value >String, which represents any string. This
value is then passed to parseInt (l. 13), for which our analysis has a semantic
model: it returns an integral number if the string argument can be parsed and
NaN otherwise. In this case, for any string as input, it returns >Number, i.e., any
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number. The resulting value stored in n is then used in a property lookup on
the array object arr (l. 15). The information in our abstract state at this point
is precise enough to give a close approximation for the lookup with a key value
of >Number, which is converted to a string value during lookup according to
JavaScript semantics. Consequently, the values with property names “0” and
“1” match the lookup because they are number strings, and are thus returned
as results to fn. The value undefined is also returned because >Number includes
numbers that are not in arr (e.g., 2, 42.3, ...). Note, however, that because
>Number matches number strings only, the lookup does not match length or
any of the internal array functions (e.g. find()), which can be accessed from a
JavaScript array object by following its prototype chain. To approximate the
control-flow behavior of the if-statement starting in line 17, we perform its test
against our abstract state. Abstract interpretation determines that because fn
may be undefined, the then-branch (l. 19) can be taken, and the call to app.alert
may be executed. In the else-branch (also reachable due to the abstract value
of fn), abstract interpretation can remove undefined from the possible values of
fn (before reaching line 23) because it contradicts the if-condition. This proves
that the call to the function object fn, can invoke only the two functions defined
inside arr. It cannot call any other function, and cannot fail due to fn not being
a function object.
3 Malware Detection
In this section we describe in detail how to detect malicious JavaScript in PDF
files using conservative abstract interpretation and how we overcome parser
confusion attacks that plague existing PDF JavaScript code extractors. Our
description of processing steps follows the flowchart in Figure 2.
3.1 Pre-processing step: extraction
Our approach requires JavaScript code to be extracted from PDF documents
before it can be analyzed. While conceptually simple, the PDF format makes
extraction extremely tricky. Indeed, JavaScript code can be embedded in differ-
ent PDF constructs, encoded with various uncommon encodings, compressed,
and encrypted, meaning that JavaScript code extraction requires a full-fledged
PDF parser. Moreover, Carmony et al. [16] showed that PDF viewers often
deviate from the specification, in an attempt to “just work”, and that existing
open-source and commercial JavaScript code extractors all fail to extract code
from various PDF documents. As a result of their work, they compiled a set
of 2952 PDF documents that are known to cause extraction issues in one or
more JavaScript code extractors. Starting from those documents with hard-
to-extract JavaScript code, we extended an existing commercial extractor [7]
until it could successfully extract JavaScript code from all documents in the
set. Because static code extraction can reach code that might not be loaded
dynamically (e.g form actions that are only triggered when interacting with the
11
Table 1: Extractor limitations and associated PDF constructs
Extractor limitation Problematic PDF construct
Implementation Bugs
Comment in document trailer
Comment in dictionary object
Trailing whitespace in stream data
Null object reference
Security handler revision 5 hex
encoded encryption data parsing
Security handler revision 3, 4
encryption key computation
Hexadecimal string literal in encoded
objects
Design Errors
Use of orphaned encryption objects
Security handler revision 5 key
computation with clear metadata
Omissions
No XFA support
No security handler revision 5 support
No security handler revision 6 support
Ambiguities
Invalid object keywords
No cross-reference table
Wrong or missing entries in the
cross-reference table
Partially broken compressed
streams
document), we claim that our approach analyzes a strict superset of the code
that can be extracted by dynamically loading a PDF document in a sandbox.
In the following paragraph, we briefly introduce the PDF format, focusing
only on elements that are relevant to code extraction. We refer the interested
reader to [22] for an extensive description of the Portable Document Format
(PDF). For code extraction purposes, the four most important elements of the
PDF syntax are: (1) direct objects, which are the basic building blocks of a
PDF; (2) indirect objects, which are uniquely identified, and can be referenced
from elsewhere in the document; (3) cross-reference tables, which contain the
positions of objects in the file; and (4) content streams, which store various parts
of the document content. Content streams are composed of two parts: a stream
that is an optionally compressed and encrypted byte sequence, and a meta-
data dictionary object that carries information about the stream’s encoding and
how to uncompress it. Because Adobe Reader can cope with partially broken
compressed streams, and unspecified encodings, we extended our extractor with
12
the same capabilities.
Furthermore, because JavaScript code in PDF documents is usually bro-
ken into snippets and spread across several content streams, a code extractor
must not only extract the various snippets from streams, it must also parse the
document in order to recover its structure and re-assemble the snippets into a
semantically valid program. In [16], the authors list several constructs that are
known to cause PDF parser failures and extraction errors. We report those con-
structs in Table 1, along with additional problematic constructs we addressed
in our extractor (in bold). In Table 1, security handlers refer to various en-
cryption algorithms that can be used to encrypt streams, and XFA refers to the
XML Forms Architecture, which is supported by the PDF specification, and
that allows the embedding of JavaScript actions in XML forms. After metic-
ulous extensions, our extractor now supports all constructs listed in Table 1
and extracts JavaScript code from all of the original 2952 PDF documents with
hard-to-extract JavaScript code that contain non-empty JavaScript code and
that do not cause our extractor to fail. Indeed, during manual investigation of
the documents with no extracted JavaScript, we observed that all of them con-
tain an empty JavaScript string (e.g. /JS()/S/JavaScript). We believe that
because the approach in [16] detects JavaScript code by monitoring loads of the
EScript.api module, which would be triggered by the /JavaScript keyword,
it mistakenly tags those files as containing JavaScript code. We also observed
that most of the hard-to-extract files that cause extraction failure are so broken
that they cannot be opened with Acrobat Reader DC 2018.011. Hence, we are
highly confident that our extractor retrieves all the JavaScript code that can be
extracted.
3.2 Main analysis step: abstract interpretation
During the main analysis step, we perform abstract interpretation of the ex-
tracted JavaScript code. As secondary input, we provide a model of the JavaScript
runtime environment emulating that of a concrete PDF viewer, which we refer
to as our PDF-JS model. The role of the PDF-JS model is to provide extracted
JavaScript code with an abstract environment for analysis emulating that of
a PDF viewer application. It thus captures (a subset of) the PDF-JavaScript
specification [4, 3]. For example, the global static objects app and doc are made
available as part of the JavaScript environment according to Adobe’s documen-
tation. Unlike a concrete JavaScript-based environment, which would be used
for dynamic analysis, our model can make use of abstract semantics (i.e. not
all API functions must provide concrete results), as long as it remains conser-
vative, i.e., it must not under-approximate the behavior of the JavaScript API.
We present the PDF-JS model in detail in Section 3.4.
To support JavaScript code in XFA and its interactions with objects specified
as XML entities, we provide additional modeling. In accordance with available
documentation [5], the analysis extracts and dynamically models XFA entities
as JavaScript objects and, using the same principles as the PDF-JS model,
provides an environment to analyze XFA JavaScript code.
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The result we receive from this analysis step must represent an over-approximation
of the JavaScript code’s behavior. In situations where abstract interpretation
cannot reach a fixpoint, no valid over-approximation is available, and thus the
analysis immediately reports a potential malware. Causes for not reaching a
fixpoint are: (1) the analysis reaching a timeout or exhausting the available
memory; and (2) syntactic or semantic errors in the extracted JavaScript code
causing the analysis to fail. Only if the analysis reaches a fixpoint, we pass on
the result of abstract interpretation to the final whitelisting step.
3.3 Post-processing step: semantic whitelist
The last step of our static analysis classifies the extracted JavaScript as either
safe or malicious. This is done by inspecting the result of abstract interpretation
from the previous step. For our analysis to be conservative, SAFE-PDF has
to reject a PDF document as malicious if the result of performing abstract
interpretation on its extracted JavaScript code cannot prove the absence of all
of the following:
1. a call to a vulnerable API method
2. a potentially malicious program behavior
3. an unknown behavior
We detect the use of vulnerable APIs (1) by building a PDF-JS model (see Sec-
tion 3.4), which, through semantic modeling, selectively whitelists those API
methods known not to be vulnerable. As a result, any call to a non-whitelisted
method is detected as malicious. To detect the second class of malware (2)
that typically performs heap spraying to exploit memory corruption in the lan-
guage runtime, we detect the creation of large values. Specifically, our semantic
whitelisting detects the following potentially malicious program behavior:
• string length exceeding a predefined limit;
• object (array) size exceeding a predefined limit.
Finally (3), because SAFE-PDF is conservative, it needs to report any code as
malware that exhibits unknown behavior, which makes it impossible to prove
the absence of calls to vulnerable API methods or malicious program behavior.
For example, calls to all eval-like functions that allow arbitrary strings to be
interpreted as code are causes of unknown behavior. Indeed, the effect of calling
an eval-like function is usually statically intractable. Similarly, calls to imprecise
function objects (due to aliasing or function lookup using an unknown input
value, e.g., a >String value) cause unknown behavior as well.
14
1 function PDF_Event() {
2 this.type = >String
3 this.name = >String
4 this.change = >String
5 this.changeEx = >String
6 this.commitKey = >Number
7 this.fieldFull = >Bool
8 this.keyDown = >Bool
9 this.modifier = >Bool
10 this.rc = >Bool
11 this.selEnd = >Number
12 this.selStart = >Number
13 this.shift = >Bool
14 this.source = PDF_DOM_NODE
15 this.target = PDF_DOM_NODE
16 this.targetName = PDF_DOM_NODE.name
17 this.value = >String
18 this.willCommit = >Bool
19 }
20
21 var PDF_DOM_NODE = {
22 name: >String
23 setFocus: function() { return >Bool },
24 value: >String
25 }
Listing 6: Mock PDF event object used for analysis by SAFE-PDF
3.4 The PDF-JS model
Our analysis depends on a model that emulates the PDF environment during
abstract interpretation. In our implementation, this model is based on a set
of PDF documents containing benign JavaScript code, while relying on an API
reference [3, 4] and being aware of reported vulnerabilities. Because SAFE-
PDF is conservative, it always interprets calls to non-whitelisted functions as
malicious. As a result, given valid JavaScript code, reducing the false positive
rate of SAFE-PDF usually means extending the model. This is a straight-
forward and incremental process, and we show in Section 4 that it yields very
good results in practice.
Unknown inputs can lead to unknown behavior during abstract interpreta-
tion, depending on how they are used. This can result in a non-malicious PDF
document being classified as malicious (i.e., a false positive). To reduce false
positives, we can optionally enrich the PDF-JS model with concrete metadata
extracted from the PDF document. Inputs from the user and the host environ-
ment, however, cannot be statically known and thus always introduce unknown
values during abstract interpretation. Depending on their origin, however, such
non-deterministic values can be modeled with different levels of precision. For
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example, an input from the user in a free text form field would be conservatively
modeled as >String while the runtime variable representing the operating system
of the user can be modeled as a set of concrete values like {'WIN','MAC','UNIX'}.
In general, we can start with a model containing many conservative approxima-
tions and refine it where necessary.
Similar to JavaScript in web browsers, JavaScript code in PDF documents
is largely event-driven, i.e., either triggered by system or user events. While
we observed that most malicious code is executed when the PDF document is
opened, JavaScript code may be placed in event handlers, where it is executed
only on certain user actions (e.g., clicking a form field). Because we cannot
exclude the possibility that an event handler might contain malicious code,
SAFE-PDF must consider every event handler as an entry point. Moreover,
because event handlers can have side effects that alter the computation of other
event handlers, SAFE-PDF loops over all handlers and triggers them until a
fixpoint is reached, indicating that it computed a suitable over-approximation
for the whole program. Because event handlers receive an event object as ar-
gument and operate on its properties, our PDF-JS model defines a mock PDF
event object that is passed to event handlers at analysis time. Listing 6 shows
the mock PDF event object of our PDF-JS model. The right-hand side values
>String, >Bool, >Number represent abstract values. They stand for any string,
any Boolean, and any number respectively. The PDF_DOM_NODE abstracts nodes
in the PDF Document Object Model (DOM) to which events can be attached.
4 Experimental Evaluation
To assess the effectiveness, and robustness of our technique, we implemented
the SAFE-PDF tool, and investigated the following research questions:
RQ1: How does the precision, recall and accuracy of SAFE-PDF compare to
state-of-the-art malware detection tools?
RQ2: How resilient is SAFE-PDF to parser confusion and mimicry attacks
compared to state-of-the-art tools?
4.1 Experiment setup
SAFE-PDF is based on version 1.0 of the SAFE abstract interpretation frame-
work for ECMAScript [29]. We complement the original SAFE framework with
(1) malware-specific analyses, (2) our semantic models for the PDF JavaScript
and XFA environments, and (3) further modeling of the interactions between
XML and JavaScript in XFA forms.
Experiments were conducted on a set of 14 306 benign and 9410 malicious
PDF documents. Malicious samples were collected from VirusShare [12], a free
online repository of malware samples, Contagio [2], and VirusTotal [13]. The
benign benchmark set contains non-malicious PDF documents from Contagio,
VirusTotal, PDF attachments from a public email dataset [14], as well as sam-
ples collected from the Web (from Google queries targeting PDF documents, e.g.
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Table 2: PDF sample benchmarks used in this study
Benchmark Source #Files
Malicious
Contagio 7110
VirusShare 1206
VirusTotal 1094
Benign
Contagio 388
EDRMv2 4434
VirusTotal 2137
Web 7347
filetype:PDF), test cases for PDF.js, the PDF-rendering engine of Mozilla [9],
test cases for PDFium, the PDF-rendering engine of Chrome [8], and interac-
tive documents from the pdfPictures [10] website. The samples from VirusTotal
include the hard-to-extract set of documents4 from [16], which we refer to in Sec-
tion 3.1. All downloaded PDF documents were confirmed to be non-malicious
using VirusTotal. Table 2 lists the different benchmark sets, the number of files
they contain, and whether they contain malicious or benign samples.
To extract JavaScript code from PDF documents, we extended version 2015.1.4
of the Clean Content SDK [7], as described in Section 3.1. In the rare cases
where a PDF document causes Clean Content to fail with an extraction error, we
pre-process the document with a modified version of PDFBox [1] in an attempt
to fix structural issues. Also, we syntactically remove one particular nonsensical
but benign code fragment, a call5 to the non-existent jQuery.post method, from
the extracted JavaScript code. Instances of this call were introduced into our
web-sourced dataset by an obviously broken web-based PDF creator.
For our experimental evaluation, we set a 30 second timeout for the abstract
interpretation step, after which SAFE-PDF rejects an input as malware. We
run six instances of SAFE-PDF in parallel sharing eight cores of a Xeon E5-
2.60GHz with 32GB RAM. On average SAFE-PDF takes less than 4 seconds to
perform analysis (i.e., extraction and abstract interpretation) of a single PDF
document.
The PDF-JS model in SAFE-PDF was incrementally extended to whitelist
the subset of JavaScript functionality used by the benign samples in our bench-
marks. Our experience suggests that supporting a new functionality in the
PDF-JS model typically requires one to two lines of JavaScript code. In cases
where a fine-grained model is needed, however, a developer can use all (sane)
features of the JavaScript language.
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Table 3: Numbers of true positives (TP), true negatives (TN), false positives
(FP), false negatives (FN), and errors per tool
Tool TP TN FP FN Errors
Slayer 9125 13877 10 72 631
Hidost 9215 14086 6 31 377
SAFE-PDF 9396 13920 321 7 72
Table 4: Precision, recall and accuracy of Slayer, Hidost, and SAFE-PDF
Tool Precision Recall Accuracy
Slayer 95.62 99.23 97.89
Hidost 97.72 99.67 98.95
SAFE-PDF 96.06 99.93 98.34
4.2 RQ1: Comparison to state-of-the-art tools
To determine how SAFE-PDF compares to the state-of-the-art, we compared
the detection rate of SAFE-PDF against two other publicly available PDF mal-
ware detection tools: PDF Malware Slayer [34], and Hidost [46].
PDF Malware Slayer first identifies keywords that are characteristic of be-
nign and malicious documents from sets of benign and malicious PDFs. It
then trains a Random Forests classifier on feature vectors obtained by com-
puting the frequency of characteristic keywords in each document. To measure
the precision, recall, and accuracy of PDF Malware Slayer, we perform a 10-
fold cross-validation experiment with default parameters and report averaged
results.
Hidost also uses a Random Forests classifier to identify malicious PDFs.
Hidost mainly differs from PDF Malware Slayer in the way it extracts feature
vectors from PDFs. Hidost builds feature vectors by extracting structural paths
from PDF documents, where structural paths capture the embedding of PDF
components. Because Hidost was initially trained and tested on a very large
dataset, comprising more than 400,000 documents, it considers only structural
paths present in at least 1000 documents by default. To accommodate our
smaller dataset, we reduced this threshold to 200. Because Hidost also uses a
random classifier, we perform a 10-fold cross-validation experiment and report
averaged results.
Table 3 summarizes the output of PDF Malware Slayer, Hidost and SAFE-
PDF on our benchmarks. In Table 3, the last column counts “errors”, i.e., when
the tool failed to analyze a PDF document, either by failing silently, ignoring
4https://goo.gl/qtbuOC
5jQuery.post(Drupal.settings.basePath + 'jstats.php', {...})
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Table 5: Parser confusion and reverse mimicry attacks
Obfuscation Slayer Hidost
SAFE-
PDF
None 3 3 3
Flate compression, obj streams 3 3 3
Flate compression, R5 security handler 7 3 3
Flate compression, R5 security handler, obj streams 7 3 3
Flate compression, R6 security handler 7 7 3
Flate compression, R6 security handler, obj streams 7 7 3
Flate compression, R6 security handler, obj streams,
comment in trailer
7 7 3
JS encoded as UTF-16BE in hex string 3 3 3
JS encoded as UTF-16BE in hex string, flate compres-
sion, obj streams
3 3 3
JS encoded as UTF-16BE in hex string, flate compres-
sion, R5 security handler, obj streams, comment in
trailer
7 3 3
Reverse mimicry attack + parser confusion 7 7 3
it, or by exiting with an error. The errors in SAFE-PDF all stem from heavily
broken PDF documents that cause our code extractor to fail.
Table 4 lists the precision, recall, and accuracy of all of the investigated
tools. Equations (1) to (3) show the corresponding formulas, where TP , FP ,
TN and FN stand for true positive, false positive, true negative and false
negative respectively.
Precision =
TP
(TP + FP )
(1)
Recall =
TP
(TP + FN)
(2)
Accuracy =
(TP + TN)
(TP + TN + FP + FN)
(3)
All of the evaluated tools failed to analyze some PDF documents, either
through silent failure (e.g., not analyzing the document) or by exiting with an
error. Because SAFE-PDF is conservative, we treat any extraction failure as
an indication that the document is malicious. To perform a fair comparison, we
treat errors in other tools as malicious reports too.
Going back to our initial research question, the metrics presented in Table 4
show that SAFE-PDF achieves comparable precision, recall and accuracy with
state-of-the-art PDF malware detectors.
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4.3 RQ2: Resilience to evasion attacks
To evaluate the resilience of SAFE-PDF to evasion, we evaluated SAFE-PDF
on malicious PDF documents that were specifically designed by the authors of
[16] to evade detection by performing parser confusion and reverse mimicry at-
tacks [33]. Table 5 shows how many evasive variants were detected by Slayer,
Hidost, and SAFE-PDF . Interestingly, while parser confusion attacks were de-
signed to primarily target approaches that rely on JavaScript code extraction,
Table 5 shows how tools that rely on structural PDF features are also affected.
Indeed, all malicious documents containing R5 handlers evaded Slayer, while
documents containing R6 security handlers evaded both Slayer and Hidost.
SAFE-PDF caught all evasive variants based on parser confusion.
Furthermore, because SAFE-PDF statically analyzes program behavior, it
is oblivious to reverse mimicry attacks, which are known to be very effective
against structure-based approaches [33, 45, 50]. Indeed, as shown in Table 5,
SAFE-PDF could detect the malicious payload, even in the presence of both
reverse mimicry and parser confusion attacks.
5 Discussion
In this section, we discuss open challenges for JavaScript-based PDF malware
detectors and present a threat model for SAFE-PDF together with possible
attacks.
5.1 JavaScript-based malware detection
All JavaScript-based PDF malware detectors need to extract the JavaScript
code from the PDF document either dynamically through an instrumented PDF
viewer or statically using a stand-alone extractor. As highlighted in [16], how-
ever, because the PDF specification is very complex, extracting JavaScript code
from PDF documents is far from trivial. While we addressed all known limita-
tions of existing extractors, static analysis of JavaScript remains very difficult.
In the following paragraphs, we discuss the challenges that SAFE-PDF faced
during analysis of our benchmark set.
First, because SAFE-PDF is designed for high recall, we manually investi-
gated the 7 false negatives reported in Table 3 and confirmed that all of them
stem from documents that contain benign JavaScript only. Specifically, 4 PDFs
trigger a JavaScript alert message that encourages the user to open a malicious
file attachment, 2 PDFs contain benign form manipulation code only, and 1
PDF contains a malicious payload that is embedded in a JavaScript function
that is never called.
Next, we investigated the causes of malware reports in the benign and ma-
licious benchmark sets to learn what causes the analysis to classify a sample as
malware. Table 6 breaks down the causes and shows their proportions relative
to all malware reports in each of the two sets.
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Table 6: Causes of malware reports by SAFE-PDF
Benchmark Report Cause Count Percentage
Benign
Unexpected behavior 145 37.56%
Malicious behavior 129 33.42%
Extraction error 65 16.84%
JS parsing error 41 10.62%
Fixpoint not reached 6 1.55%
Malicious
Malicious behavior 8510 91.20%
Unexpected behavior 564 6.04%
JS parsing error 172 1.84%
Fixpoint not reached 78 0.84%
Extraction error 7 0.08%
1 qwe = ('nhsthn','ntrht').substr;
2 var g = qwe();
Listing 7: Example of unexpected behavior exhibited by malware (excerpt)
“Malicious behavior” refers to a whitelist violation, e.g., creation of a large
object, or a call to a vulnerable API method or to eval. As expected, it is the
top cause for identifying true positives in the “Malicious” benchmark set. In the
“Benign” set, “Malicious behavior” indicates the use of a (historically) vulnera-
ble API in a non-malicious way and such cases are responsible for approximately
a third of false positive reports. We plan to address some of these false reports
in the next version of SAFE-PDF by inspecting the abstract values that reach
vulnerable APIs. I.e., we will not report PDFs where abstract interpretation
can prove the absence of a malicious payload reaching a vulnerable API.
The remaining causes for malware reports, are instances of SAFE-PDF being
conservative. In both benchmark sets, the majority of conservative reports can
be attributed to broken JavaScript code (“unexpected behavior” and JS parsing
error) and PDF documents broken beyond repair (“Extraction error”). Looking
into the benign documents for which extraction fails, we found that the majority
(57) come from the hard-to-extract set, of which 13 were broken during HTTP
download (before being submitted to VirusTotal), and only two can be opened
with Acrobat Reader DC 2018.011. A small fraction of malware reports is
caused by abstract interpretation aborting due to lack of precision or timing out
(“Fixpoint not reached”). In all these cases, we cannot safely over-approximate
the behavior of JavaScript code and thus have to classify it as malicious.
“Unexpected behavior” refers to cases where SAFE-PDF encounters seman-
tically incorrect JavaScript code, such as property loads from undefined vari-
ables, calls to undefined functions, and other behavior that should not occur in
a functionally correct PDF document.
However, we cannot simply conclude that these are honest mistakes (bugs)
21
that can safely be ignored, especially not in the context of JavaScript execution,
where engines are known for their lenient and non-standard ways of handling
errors. Indeed, obvious bugs also occur in malicious code: Listing 7 shows an
example of malware being identified through unexpected behavior before its
actual malicious behavior is detected. At line 1, the comma operator evalu-
ates each of its operands (from left to right) and returns the value of the last
operand [6]. Then, qwe is assigned the substr function, which is not bound to
any receiver object at this point in the program. Next, qwe is called at line 2
without a receiver object, resulting in an exception being thrown. SAFE-PDF
correctly identifies the call qwe() as faulty, and conservatively reports the input
as malware. We confirmed that this code snippet raises an exception in recent
JavaScript engines (e.g., Node.js v8.1.4).
After manual inspection, we concluded that the high number of “unexpected
behavior” in the benign benchmark set is due to semantically incorrect code
that either has not been properly tested or maintained or even ended up inside
a PDF document by accident (e.g., code that only makes sense in the context
of a website). As described in Section 4.1, we handle one frequently occuring
instance falling into the last cateogry, but have not addressed all issues of this
kind due to time constraints. The existence of such erroneous code can be
explained by PDF viewers silently ignoring JavaScript errors.
5.2 Threat model and possible attacks
In this section, we present a realistic threat model and explore potential attacks
against SAFE-PDF .
We assume an attacker is trying to have malicious JavaScript code inside a
PDF, originally reported as such by SAFE-PDF , misclassified as benign. The
attacker can manipulate the PDF document however they want. We further
assume that the attacker has black-box access to SAFE-PDF and can observe
the outcome report only (e.g., benign or malicious). We also assume that the
attacker can submit an unlimited number of PDFs to SAFE-PDF . We further
assume that the attacker knows that SAFE-PDF uses abstract interpretation
and a model of the PDF viewer runtime environment, but has no access to it.
Because we are interested in attacks against SAFE-PDF and not the JavaScript
code extractor, we finally assume that all the JavaScript code in the PDF can
be extracted without error.
First, because SAFE-PDF analyzes JavaScript code only, it is oblivious to
mimicry attacks [33, 45] that alter the structure of the PDF document without
altering the malicious behavior of its payload. In [50], the authors showed how
they could use genetic algorithms to automatically alter the structure of 500
malware samples so that they successfully evade Hidost [46] and PDFRate [43].
On the other hand, SAFE-PDF might be vulnerable to the following four
threats: (1) zero-day vulnerabilities that only exhibit whitelisted behaviors;
(2) discrepancies between the concrete semantics of a PDF viewer’s JavaScript
engine and the abstract semantics of the SAFE abstract interpreter; (3) unsound
approximations in the PDF-JS model; and (4) novel parser confusion attacks.
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In the following paragraphs, we explore each threat in more detail.
Obviously, zero-day vulnerabilities that are not exploited using JavaScript
are out of scope for SAFE-PDF . Otherwise, for SAFE-PDF to miss a JavaScript-
based exploit, the exploit must use a function that has been whitelisted. Indeed,
if the vulnerability exploits any function that is not whitelisted, SAFE-PDF will
interpret the function call as “unexpected behavior”, and conservatively report
the PDF as malware. Hence, to exploit a zero-day vulnerability, the attacker
has to find a vulnerability in a whitelisted function, and ensure that the payload
that exploits the vulnerability does not exhibit any known malicious behavior
(e.g., heap spraying). While not impossible, this attack is very unlikely.
The abstract semantics used in SAFE-PDF is currently based on the EC-
MAScript 5.1 language specification and thus might differ from the ECMAScript
version supported in PDF viewers. However, exploiting discrepancies between
the abstract and concrete semantics is far from trivial. First, using language
features that are not supported by the abstract semantics of SAFE-PDF will
result in undefined behavior and the PDF being reported as malware. There-
fore, the attacker must identify semantic discrepancies that are due to either
implementation bugs in the viewer or in SAFE-PDF and exploit them. This
type of attack is also very unlikely, but not unheard of [47].
Because SAFE-PDF relies on the analysis being conservative, it makes it
vulnerable to unsoundness bugs in the PDF-JS model. Indeed, we assume that
SAFE-PDF strictly over-approximates all possible runtime execution paths, and
every unsoundness bug in the PDF-JS model introduces an opportunity for an
attacker to hide malicious behavior behind an under-approximation. Because
the PDF-JS model was built manually, it is prone to human errors and makes
SAFE-PDF vulnerable to unsoundness bugs. A superior, but far more costly
solution would be to automatically infer the PDF-JS model based on a set of
concrete PDF viewer applications.
Finally, because the PDF specification is very complex, yet vague, and PDF
viewers often deviate from it, an attacker could try to trigger new parser con-
fusion attacks. However, because SAFE-PDF treats extraction errors conser-
vatively, and reports malware on extraction failures, an attacker would have to
find a way to hide his payload from the extractor without causing an extraction
failure. While such an attack would require a dedicated attacker, we believe it
is the most serious threat to SAFE-PDF .
6 Related Work
In this section, we give a brief overview of existing techniques for PDF malware
detection (a detailed survey and taxonomy can be found in [36]) and explain
how they compare to our analysis approach. We also discuss semantic malware
detection and JavaScript static analysis, which are related fields of research.
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6.1 Static PDF Malware Detection
The first group of approaches proposed in academic literature that we consider
as related work analyzes a PDF document as a whole and does not analyze
any embedded JavaScript code. These techniques are categorized as Metadata
Analysis in [36]. Three properties of PDF documents are being used to derive a
fingerprint : document structure, metadata fields, and document content. The
related approaches [43, 34, 38, 37, 46] rely on a set of known malicious PDF
documents as training data to identify documents with a similar fingerprint as
malware.
Caradoc [22] is an exception to the above. Endignoux et al. focus on weak-
nesses in the PDF standard related to document structure. These can be ex-
ploited to attack the parser implementation of a PDF viewer, e.g., to achieve a
denial-of-service attack.
Comparison to our approach When aiming to identify malicious PDF
documents that exploit vulnerabilities in the JavaScript runtime of a PDF
viewer, our approach is more powerful, since it does not depend on a train-
ing set and is not susceptible to mimicry attacks.
6.2 Static PDF-JavaScript Malware Detection
Similar to SAFE-PDF , the related work in this section performs a static analysis
of JavaScript code embedded in PDF documents. However, unlike us, but sim-
ilar to the approaches in Section 6.1, they identify malicious JavaScript based
on its similarity to known malicious samples.
PJScan [28] and Vatamanu’s approach [49] both perform lexical analysis of
the extracted JavaScript code, and use machine learning techniques to classify
the code as malicious or non-malicious. In [25], the authors describe of use
NiCad, an existing tool for detecting code clones, for the same purpose.
Comparison to our approach The approaches above are always less pow-
erful than our static analysis, because they restrict themselves to lexical analysis
of JavaScript code and do not take its semantics into account. Both approaches
rely on the similarity of (possibly obfuscated) JavaScript code to known mali-
cious code, and might be defeated by novel obfuscation patterns.
6.3 Dynamic PDF Malware Detection
All approaches in this section rely on the execution of PDF-embedded JavaScript
code, either in its native or synthetic runtime environment, for analysis of its
behavior.
MDScan [48] and PDF Scrutinizer execute the extracted JavaScript code in
a synthetic environment, and aim to detect the presence of malicious payload
(so called shell code) in the execution state (as part of strings and variables).
PDF Scrutinizer applies further heuristics to identify execution patterns typical
of malicious code. Other uses of dynamic analysis proposed in literature do not
compare directly to our approach because they are not suitable as stand-alone
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analysis tools. For example, MPScan [32] and FCScan [42] propose to integrate
with the PDF viewer software, and ShellOS [44] integrates with the underlying
operating system to detect attacks (on-the-fly) during runtime.
Comparison to our approach Dynamic analysis techniques are prone to
miss feasible program behavior, because actual execution depends on inputs
and the execution environment. In the context of malware analysis, the mal-
ware author can actively target a specific environment, thus preventing the
detection of malicious behavior in the analysis environment. For example, the
de-obfuscation of exploit code might be triggered only in a specific target en-
vironment. This undermines the dynamic analysis-based detection techniques
described above. Furthermore, unlike our static analysis-based approach, none
of the existing dynamic analyses tries to exhaustively explore all possible be-
havior of the JavaScript code.
6.4 Semantic-Based Malware Detection
Semantic approaches use techniques from program analysis and formal meth-
ods to lift malware detection from syntactic features to the level of program
semantics. For example, semantic malware detectors use theorem proving [18]
or model checking [26] to match a program, based on its semantic properties
(e.g., instruction sequences), against a template derived from actual malware.
In general, these approaches are more powerful than signature matching, but
still prone to evasion by obfuscation. Preda et al. [40] introduce a theoretical
framework for semantic malware detection using abstract interpretation. It as-
sumes the availability of perfect oracles, which return perfect information related
to a program’s semantic properties or behavior (e.g., its exact control flow), and
shows that whether a detector can overcome a particular obfuscation, depends
on the chosen abstract semantics, i.e., the right level of abstraction. More
recently, [39] uses statistical analysis of program behavior recorded during dy-
namic analysis to identify malware. This avoids the difficulty of static reasoning,
but introduces the possibility of dynamic analysis missing malicious behavior.
Comparison to our approach Our work can be seen as an instance of
malware detection based on Preda’s interesting actions [40, Section 5]. How-
ever, we use a policy to whitelist acceptable behavior and thus do not have to
rely on actual malware as templates for malicious behavior. Furthermore, our
conservative strategy enables us to have a practical malware detector in the
absence of ”perfect oracles”
6.5 Web JavaScript Malware Detection
The primary vector for JavaScript-based malware remains web browsers. Promi-
nent work in this area includes Nozzle [41], Zozzle [20], and Rozzle [27]. Nozzle is
a dynamic, in-browser approach that uses heap sampling to detect heap-spraying
attacks. Similar to other dynamic approaches, Nozzle requires an instrumented
environment, a browser in this case, and induces a performance overhead. Zoz-
zle is a mostly static approach that reduces the performance overhead of Nozzle.
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It uses a Na¨ıve Bayes classifier, trained on syntactic features of the JavaScript
code, to classify programs as benign or malicious. Zozzle relies on the browser’s
JavaScript interpreter to de-obfuscate the code before performing feature extrac-
tion and classification. Because both Nozzle and Zozzle rely on an instrumented
browser environment, both approaches are susceptible to miss malware that ex-
hibits malicious behavior on other environments only. Rozzle addresses this
limitation through the use of symbolic execution to emulate different runtime
environments in a single instrumented browser.
Comparison to our approach Through the use of abstract interpretation,
our work detects heap spraying (like Nozzle), performs de-obfuscation (like Zoz-
zle), and simulates different runtime environments (like Rozzle) entirely stati-
cally. Furthermore, SAFE-PDF can statically reason about the runtime behav-
ior of the code, making it more powerful than syntax-based approaches.
6.6 JavaScript Static Analysis
The dynamic nature of JavaScript and its lack of static guarantees make it a
difficult target for static analysis. This shortcoming is magnified by the inherent
complexity of the most common use of JavaScript, as client-side web application
code running inside an equally complex browser environment. At this point in
time, state-of-the-art tools based on dataflow analysis [21] or precise abstract
interpretation [24, 30] can successfully analyze libraries and small applications,
but do not scale to real-world JavaScript code in general.
We are nonetheless successful in using the very same techniques to analyze
JavaScript in the context of malware detection. This is due to two reasons:
(1) JavaScript code embedded in PDF documents is not as complex as code
written for the web; (2) malware detection warrants a conservative strategy
where unknown behaviors are interpreted as malicious.
7 Conclusion
We presented a novel approach for detecting malicious JavaScript embedded
in PDF documents that uses abstract interpretation—a static program anal-
ysis technique—at its core. Using the results of abstract interpretation in a
conservative manner, our malware detection is designed for and achieves very
high recall. Furthermore, with an average runtime of less than 4 seconds per
document, we showed how traditionally “heavy-weight” abstract interpretation
tools can be used in practice, given the right abstraction (e.g. the PDF-JS
model). By addressing all known limitations of existing PDF JavaScript code
extractors, we showed that PDF malware detectors that analyze the embedded
JavaScript code can be used in practice. We also showed how SAFE-PDF re-
sists obfuscation, parser confusion, and mimicry evasion attacks that subvert
existing malware detector tools. Finally, through comprehensive experimental
evaluation, we have shown that our approach achieves almost perfect recall, and
comparable precision to state-of-the-art tools.
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